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Landlord's Liability for Ice and Snow
Michael R. Gareau*
T HE RELATION OF LANDLORD AND TENANT creates rights and liabilities
for each. The landlord who rents a part of his premises and retains
a portion thereof which is used in common by all of the tenants is
deemed to have retained control of such portion and a duty is imposed
upon him to keep it in a reasonably safe condition.' Since the landlord
has the obligation to keep the common ways in a reasonably safe con-
dition, the question arises whether or not this obligation is imposed upon
a landlord where the common areas are rendered unsafe due to accumu-
lations of ice or snow.
Under the common law, it is generally held that a landlord has no
duty to his tenants to remove natural accumulations of ice or snow from
the common areas and passageways over which he has retained control. 2
Thus, the landlord will not be held liable if a tenant sustains injury
due to a fall on a common sidewalk or stairway on which the landlord
has permitted ice or snow to accumulate in a jurisdiction still following
the common law.
3
The common law rule is prevalent in jurisdictions where, in the
absence of a contract to the contrary, the landlord is merely required to
maintain the retained portion of the leased premises in the condition in
which it was, or appeared to be, at the time the lease agreement was
entered into.4 If, however, the landlord obligates himself either by con-
tract or by assumption of the duty to remove natural accumulations of
ice or snow, most jurisdictions impose upon the landlord the duty to
remove such ice or snow. If the landlord fails to do so and a tenant, or
one in privity with a tenant, is injured, the landlord will be held liable.5
Unnatural Accumulations
Although the courts are generally divided on the question of a land-
lord's liability for natural accumulations of ice or snow, the same is not
true of a landlord's liability for unnatural accumulations of ice and snow.
Courts throughout the United States are in general agreement that
* B.A., Kent State University; Customer Service Representative, Aluminum Com-
pany of America; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 26 A. L. R. 2d 613 (1952).
2 52 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (d).
3 Decisions, Torts-Landlord and Tenant-Liability for Failure to Remove or Render
Safe Ice and Snow on Common Passageways and Approaches, 41 Columbia L. Rev.
349 (1941).
4 52 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 2.
5 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, § 700 (1940).
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where a latent defect in the premises causes an unnatural accumulation
of ice or snow upon the common ways and the landlord had knowledge
or should have had knowledge of such defects and failed to cure them,
liability will be imposed upon the landlord if injury results because of
his failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.6
Most cases dealing with a landlord's liability for unnatural accumu-
lations of ice or snow on the common ways concern the negligent main-
tenance of roofs and gutters. The usual case involves a situation where
snow or rain falls from the roof onto the common way and it is permitted
to freeze, thus creating a dangerous condition. Where a plaintiff charges
that the defendant was negligent due to failure to repair, the plaintiff
must establish that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of
the existing defects and that the defect was the proximate cause of the
injury.7 The court in Bailey v. Golburgh8 held that where the plaintiff
tenant had resided in the defendant's apartment house for more than
two years, the premises having been allowed to fall into disrepair during
that time as evidenced by a leak in the roof which permitted water to
fall onto the porch and steps causing ice to form, and the plaintiff was
injured because the defendant failed to cure that defect, it was not error
for the lower court to refuse to grant a directed verdict in favor of the
defendant. The court found that the evidence was properly submitted to
the jury for determination of negligence.
Likewise, a New Jersey court in Skupienski v. Maly9 held that it
was a question for the jury to determine whether a metal canopy over
a doorway was improperly constructed where such canopy had no gutter
and as a result water was permitted to drip onto a common sidewalk,
causing a dangerous condition in the form of ice which caused plaintiff
to fall and sustain injury. In Van Slyke v. Fivey,1' the plaintiff slipped
and fell on an icy walk on the leased premises. The evidence presented
indicated that water was permitted to run off the roof and to freeze on
the walk. This condition had been permitted to exist for almost two
months. The sidewalk in question was the only means of entrance and
exit. The facts presented made out a prima facie case of negligence on
the part of the defendant. However, similar evidence in Morse v. Hough-
ton failed to support a verdict for the plaintiff where the issues were
negligence and contributory negligence."
The problem of a landlord's liability when a contractor is involved
6 52 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 2; 26 A. L. R. 2d 620 (1952).
7 26 A. L. R. 626 2d (1952).
8 320 Mass. 309, 69 N. E. 2d 457 (1946).
9 27 N. J. 240, 142 A. 2d 220 (1958); also see Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123
N. E. 2d 151 (1954).
10 266 App. Div. 889, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 625 (1943).




was raised in Secor v. Levine.12 Here a contractor negligently repaired
the gutters and as a result water fell on the sidewalk and formed a coat-
ing of ice. The work of the contractor was accepted by the landlord five
months prior to the time when the plaintiff was injured. The court de-
termined that the landlord had control of the premises and that he could
not look to the contractor to reimburse him for a judgment obtained by
the tenant. In a similar case, a Colorado court held that a landlord has
a non-delegable duty to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition
and such duty cannot be delegated to a third party contractor. 3
Natural Accumulations
In the various jurisdictions in the United States which are affected
by snow and ice conditions, there have emerged two divergent views
as to a landlord's liability to his tenants for natural accumulations of ice
and snow on the common ways of the leased premises. 14 The common
law rule, often referred to as the "Massachusetts Rule," is opposed to the
more recent concept, often referred to as the "Modern Rule" or the
"Connecticut Rule." 15
The Massachusetts Rule was first announced in Woods v. Naumkeag
Steam Cotton Co.16 The plaintiff tenant slipped and fell while walking
on a common stairway and sustained an injury. The court, in denying
that liability for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was imputed to
the defendant landlord, reasoned that in the event the common passage
way became ice or snow covered, the tenant was as equally well suited
to determine the condition as was the landlord. The court also stated
that it was the duty of the tenant to remove natural accumulations of
ice and snow when such conditions materialized. The Massachusetts
Rule remains the law in Massachusetts today.' 7
The Connecticut Rule was first expounded in Reardon v. Shimel-
man,'5 and the court expressly rejected the Massachusetts Rule. The
court reasoned that when a landlord retains control over the common
approaches he must exercise reasonable care to keep these approaches
safe for his tenants and others who desire to visit such tenants. The
court also pointed out that a landlord is under a duty to keep the com-
mon ways in a reasonably safe condition and could see no reason for not
applying this standard of care to the perils resulting from natural ac-
cumulations of ice and snow.
12 273 App. Div. 899, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 226 (1948).
13 Frazier v. Edwards, 117 Colo. 502, 190 P. 2d 126 (1948).
14 Decisions, op. cit. supra n. 3.
15 Langley Park Apartments, Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, 234 Md. 402, 199 A. 2d 620 (1964).
16 134 Mass. 357, 45 Am. Rep. 344 (1883).
17 Smolesky v. Kotter, 270 Mass. 32, 169 N. E. 486 (1930); Spack v. Longwood Apart-
ments, Inc., 338 Mass. 518, 155 N. E. 2d 873 (1959).
18 102 Conn. 383, 128 A. 705 (1925).
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Application of Massachusetts Rule
The Massachusetts Rule has been consistently applied in certain
jurisdictions throughout the United States. However, it would be mis-
leading to state that the jurisdictions following the common law rule
have consistently applied this rule and have not deviated from it.
Rather, a cursory review of cases concerning a landlord's liability for
natural accumulations of ice and snow would reveal that consistency
does not prevail.
In an early New York case wherein a guest of the tenant fell on a
sidewalk leading from the street, the court established the rule that a
landlord is not liable to his tenant or a guest of a tenant for injury
sustained due to a fall on ice which was the result of natural accumula-
tion. However, the court did point out that in cases where the ice is
permitted to become rough or uneven so as to constitute an obstruction,
then the landlord is deemed liable.19 New York has not maintained the
strict common law rule, as has the state of Massachusetts. The early
rule that a landlord is liable for rough or uneven surfaces has been
modified even further.20 This modification includes liability on the part
of a landlord to maintain the common ways in a reasonably safe con-
dition. In a recent New York decision, the court went so far as to say
that a landlord would not be held liable to his tenant for injury sustained
due to natural accumulations of ice or snow until the landlord had a
reasonable length of time in which to remove such accumulations. 21
Ohio first ruled on the liability of a landlord for injury sustained by
a tenant due to natural accumulations of ice and snow in 1944.22 The
landlord in this case allowed snow and ice to accumulate for one week
prior to the injury. The court in denying liability found that the land-
lord did not create a greater danger than was created by the work of
the natural elements. The court further found that unless the landlord
assumes the obligation of snow or ice removal by contract, the tenants
must assume the burden of protecting themselves. Later Ohio cases
have not adhered to such a strict rule. In the later view, the court has
held that where a landlord has assumed the duty of maintaining the
common ways and where he retains the tools used to remove snow and
ice, these facts may be presented to the jury in determining the liability
of the landlord.3
In a recent Rhode Island case, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
19 Harkin v. Crumble, 20 Misc. 568, 46 N. Y. S. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1897); also see Dwyer v.
Woodland, 205 App. Div. 546, 199 N. Y. S. 840 (1923).
20 Gianpaola v. Paoli, 129 N. Y. S. 180 (Sup. Ct. 1911), Albert v. Wachsman, 169
N. Y. S. 138 (Sup. Ct. 1918), Rankin v. Ittner Realty Co., 242 N. Y. 339, 151 N. E. 641
(1926).
21 Preuschoff v. Wank, 16 A. D. 2d 690, 227 N. Y. S. 2d 522 (1962).
22 Turoff v. Richman, 76 Ohio App. 83, 61 N. E. 2d 486 (1944).
23 Oswald v. Jeraj, 146 Ohio St. 676, 67 N. E. 2d 779 (1946); Bowman v. Goldsmith




adopted the Massachusetts Rule. 24 The plaintiff in this action was a
tenant of the defendant landlord. While walking on the common side-
walk of the leased premises, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a patch of
ice. The court, in holding the landlord not liable, proclaimed that a land-
lord is not liable to his tenants for injuries which they sustain due to a
fall on the common ways which the landlord permitted to remain cov-
ered with ice or snow. The court declared that liability is limited to
cases where the landlord has assumed the duty of snow removal as a
term of the tenancy. This view was adopted despite an earlier view
which imposed upon the landlord the duty of maintaining common
passageways in a reasonably safe condition.25
In Cronin v. Brownlie,26 the State of Illinois adopted the Massa-
chusetts Rule over the Connecticut Rule. In this case, the plaintiff
sustained injury due to a fall on a sidewalk located on the leased prem-
ises. The apartment house in question contained four suites, one of
which was occupied by the plaintiff and another by the defendant land-
lord. The common sidewalk at the time plaintiff was injured was ice
covered with a rough and uneven surface. The trial court refused to
grant a directed verdict for the defendant. This ruling was reversed on
appeal and the court held that a directed verdict for the defendant
should have been granted. The court in reaching this conclusion stated,
In our northern climate where ice and snow come frequently and
are accepted by all, it appears to us that the rule adopted by the
majority of the states finding no liability against the landlord is
more reasonable and persuasive than the minority view.2 7
Application of Connecticut Rule
The common law view respecting the landlord's liability for natural
accumulations of ice or snow on the common ways has provided an
attractive vehicle for limiting the landlord's liability. However, the
traditional concept is giving way to a new view, one which holds a land-
lord to a greater duty of care in relation to ice and snow removal on the
common ways. The "Modern" view is a pragmatic approach to the
problem of unsafe walks and stairways rendered so because the landlord
has failed to remove ice and snow within a reasonable time after they
accumulate. Under the Massachusetts Rule, generally no duty existed;
however, the "Modern" view takes into consideration the increase in
multiple tenancy and the impracticality of requiring tenants to cure the
dangerous conditions themselves. 28
24 Pomfret v. Fletcher, 208 A. 2d 743 (R. I. Sup. Ct. 1965).
25 Lawton v. Vadenais, 84 R. I. 116, 122 A. 2d 138 (1956).
26 348 Ill. App. 448, 109 N. E. 2d 352 (1952).
27 Id. at 356.
28 26 A. L. R. 2d 614, 616 (1952); Decisions, supra n. 3.
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Although the Connecticut Rule was established in 1925 by Reardon
v. Shimelman2 9 adoption of this rule has been a recent development.
Several states were early in holding that a landlord who retains a por-
tion of the leased premises owes his tenants a duty to maintain such
portions in a reasonably safe condition by removal of natural accumula-
tions of ice and snow. However, adoption of this view has been greatest
within the last decade.
The Supreme Court of Colorado in 1934 in the case of Robinson v.
Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co.30 held that where the plaintiff sus-
tained injury due to a fall on a common way because of a patch of ice,
the landlord was liable for such injury. In this case, the defendant
claimed that his duty to make general repairs did not include the ob-
ligation of removing ice and snow. The court rejected this argument
with the observation that to accept it would put the lives of every city
dweller in jeopardy. The same court in a later decision found that it
was not improper for a lower court judge to instruct the jury that if the
defendant knowingly or due to negligence permitted ice to form on a
common sidewalk, then the defendant landlord was liable for the injuries
which his tenant sustained because of the icy condition of the walk.31
An Iowa court in Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Say. Bank32 held that a
landlord is not an insurer of the safety of his tenants. However, when
a landlord has multiple tenancy and he permits his tenants to use certain
portions of the premises, the landlord is presumed to have retained con-
trol of these portions and owes his tenants a duty to maintain them in a
reasonably safe condition. This duty applies to removal of ice and snow
which are the result of natural accumulation. The question of a land-
lord's liability was raised in a New Hampshire case wherein the tenant
had previous to the accident taken it upon himself to remove ice and
snow from the common ways. The court in Ahern v. Roux3 3 found that
a landlord owes a duty to his tenants to maintain those portions of the
premises over which he retained control. This duty includes the removal
of ice and snow. And the mere fact that the plaintiff had removed snow
in the past was not sufficient enough to exempt the landlord from li-
ability for the injury which plaintiff sustained.
The state of Delaware in 1962 was confronted with the problem as
to what rule of law to follow in relation to a landlord's liability for
natural accumulations of ice and snow. In the case of Young v. Sa-
roukos,3 4 the court made a thorough review of the subject and in the
last analysis concluded that a landlord who reserves to himself control
29 Supra n. 18.
30 94 Colo. 534, 31 P. 2d 918 (1934).
31 Frazier v. Edwards, supra n. 13.
32 244 Iowa 939, 57 N. W. 225 (1953).
33 96 N. H. 71, 69 A. 2d 701 (1949).




of certain common ways assumes the obligation of rendering them safe
and he must remove natural accumulations of snow and ice therefrom.
The court, through the words of one of its members, declared, "I un-
hesitatingly choose the Connecticut Rule and hold it is applicable
here." 35
Although the question of a landlord's liability for failure to remove
ice or snow is less apt to present itself in the state of Georgia than many
of the northern states, the question was nevertheless raised in Fincher
v. Fox.36 Here the defendant landlord claimed that he was not liable for
the injury sustained by the plaintiff due to a fall on a snow covered
driveway because such condition was brought about due to an Act of
God. The Court found that the fact that it was an Act of God did not pre-
clude the court from looking into the question of the landlord's negli-
gence in his failure to act. The test used by the court was whether or not
the landlord had knowledge of the condition for a reasonable length of
time so as to constitute constructive notice.
In 1964 the state of Maryland adopted the Connecticut Rule and
held that a landlord was liable to his tenants for injury sustained due to
natural accumulations of ice or snowy7 The court in its decision said:
-[W]here a landlord leases separate portions of his property to differ-
ent tenants, and reserves under his control passageways and stair-
ways . . . for common use of all the tenants, he must then exercise
ordinary care and diligence to maintain the retained portions in
reasonably safe condition.
38
The court further stated that liability is imposed upon a landlord who
knew or should have known of the existence of a dangerous condition
resulting from accumulations of ice or snow.39
The decision in Grizzel v. Foxx 40 provides a good example of the
logic and reasoning behind the Connecticut Rule. The court pointed out
that the landlord is required to maintain the common ways in a reason-
ably safe condition and that "To set apart this particular source of
danger (ice and snow) is to create a distinction without a sound differ-
ence." 41 The court further stated:
We are of the opinion therefore, that the general duty of the land-
lord to keep common passageways in good repair and in a safe con-
dition includes the duty of removing natural accumulations of snow
and ice within a reasonable time and that Tennessee's place is with
35 Id. at 282.
36 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S. E. 2d 651 (1963).
37 Langley Park Apartments, Sec. H., Inc. v. Lund, supra n. 15.
38 Id. at 623.
39 Id.
40 48 Tenn. App. 462, 348 S. W. 2d 815 (1960).
41 Id. at 817.
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the states that take the more realistic view of the landlord's re-
sponsibility.42
Contractual or Assumed Duty
In states where the Massachusetts Rule prevails concerning a land-
lord's liability for natural accumulations of ice and snow on the common
ways, a landlord may assume liability for snow and ice removal either
by contract as evidenced by a stipulation in the lease agreement or by
implied contract where the landlord actually assumed the obligation of
keeping the common ways clear of ice and snow. 43 In a Washington case,
the court stated that where a landlord by contract or assumption of duty
assumes the obligation of removing ice or snow from the common ways,
he must perform this obligation. If he neglects his duty and a tenant is
injured, then the landlord will be held liable for negligence due to his
failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.44
In Oswald v. Jeraj,45 the Ohio Supreme Court found that where a
landlord had complete possession of the common approaches and for
several years had removed natural accumulations of snow and ice there-
from, he had assumed the duty of snow and ice removal. Such facts may
be presented to the jury for determination of the landlord's liability. The
defendant landlord in Robinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co.46
was held liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff due to a fall on a
patch of ice. Even though the defendant claimed snow removal was
not included within its duty to make general repairs, the court pointed
out the facts indicated that the defendant had assumed the obligation
in the past and
The fact that the defendant company itself had a broader conception
of its duties than this is apparent from the testimony of its president
and general manager; that it failed in the exercise of its duty pre-
sents another question.
47
Similarly, in Massor v. Yates,48 the Oregon Supreme Court held that
where the landlord had removed sow and ice from the common ways
for about twelve days prior to the accident, the tenant was authorized to
rely on the landlord's assumption of the obligation of snow and ice re-
moval. The court, however, held that no such duty exists where the
landlord gratuitously removes ice and snow from the common ways.
42 Id.
43 26 A. L. R. 2d 624; 52 C. J. S., op. cit. supra n. 2.
44 Schedler v. Wagner, 37 Wash. 2d 612, 225 P. 2d 213 (1950).
45 Oswald v. Jeraj, supra n. 23; Turoff v. Richman, supra n. 22.
46 Robinson v. Belmont-Buckingham Holding Co., supra n. 30.
47 Id. at 920.





In a Massachusetts case, the court ruled that it was an error on the
part of the lower court to direct a verdict for the landlord where evi-
dence indicated that the landlord had assumed the duty of keeping the
steps free of ice and snow. 49 In the case of Bryans v. Gallagher,50 the
court held that where an exculpatory clause in a lease agreement re-
leases the landlord from liability for injury on account of physical de-
fects which might exist upon the premises or sidewalks, such clause
includes a release of liability for injury sustained due to natural ac-
cumulations of ice and snow on the common ways. It is interesting to
note that the court refused to comment on the imposition of liability
had the clause not been a part of the lease agreement.
Duty-Reasonable Time
Where a landlord is deemed to have a duty to remove natural ac-
cumulations of ice or snow from the common ways either because the
particular jurisdiction follows the Connecticut Rule or because the land-
lord has obligated himself by contract or by assumption of duty, the
courts allow the landlord a reasonable length of time after the snow or
ice has accumulated in which to remove the same. The facts in each
case are the determining factor as to whether or not the landlord acted
within a reasonable time.5 1
Thus, the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Sheehan v. Sette52 held
that the jury was justified in finding the defendant landlord guilty of
negligence when he had 43 hours to remove the ice from the apartment
house steps. The court pointed out that even if the defendant did not
have actual knowledge of the defect the jury was justified in finding that
the defect existed long enough to establish constructive notice and there
was a reasonable opportunity to remedy the dangerous condition.
In Werner v. Gimbel Bros. Inc.53 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held that the lower court erred in not permitting the jury to consider
whether the defendant landlord had acted within a reasonable time after
the landlord's servant arrived at 6:00 A.M. and found the sidewalk slip-
pery and ice covered and did not seek to correct that condition until
10:30 A.M. The court in Ingalls v. Isensee 54 found that it was proper
49 Hebb v. Gould, 314 Mass. 10, 49 N. E. 2d 450 (1943); see also Nash v. Webber, 204
Mass. 419, 90 N. E. 872 (1910).
50 407 Pa. 142, 178 A. 2d 766 (1962).
51 Falina v. Hollis Diner, Inc., 281 App. Div. 711, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 137 (1952); Albert v.
Wachsman, 169 N. Y. S. 138 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank,
244 Iowa 939, 57 N. W. 2d 225 (1953); Walker v. Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 45
S. E. 2d 898 (1948); Turzay v. Berkowitz, 125 N. J. L. 61, 14 A. 2d 265 (1940); Fincher
v. Fox, supra n. 36; Beck v. Shannon and Luchs Co., 174 A. 2d 199 (Munic. Ct. D. C.
1961); Goodman v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 587, 200 A. 642
(1938); Visaggi v. Frank's Bar & Grill, 4 N. J. 93, 71 A. 2d 638 (1950).
52 130 Conn. 295, 33 A. 2d 327 (1943).
53 8 Wis. 2d 491, 99 N. W. 2d 708 (1959).
54 170 Ore. 393, 133 P. 2d 614 (1943).
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for the lower court to refuse to grant to the defendant landlord a di-
rected verdict where the jury could determine from the facts presented
at the trial that the snow had remained on the apartment house steps
for over an hour before the plaintiff tenant fell and sustained injury. The
court further found that the plaintiff did not have the burden of proving
that the defendant had actual knowledge of the condition of the steps at
the time the accident occurred. In the case of Young v. Saroukos,55 the
court sets out a guide for determining whether or not the landlord has
acted within a reasonable time after the snow or ice has accumulated.
The court adopted the following rule, quoting earlier decisions from
Iowa and Virginia:
The authorities are in substantial accord in support of the rule that
a . . . landlord . . . in the absence of unusual circumstances, is per-
mitted to await the end of the storm and a reasonable time thereafter
to remove ice and snow from an outdoor entrance walk, platform, or
steps. The general controlling principle is that changing conditions
due to the pending storm render it inexpedient and impracticable to
take earlier effective action, and that ordinary care does not require
it.56 (Emphasis supplied.)
Conclusion
The decisions concerning a landlord's liability for injury sustained
by a tenant or other invitee for natural accumulations of ice or snow
are a matter of record. A review of the record will not impose the re-
viewer's opinions upon the decisions which are a part of posterity. How-
ever, in retrospect, the wisdom of trends in law can be examined and
conclusions drawn from a review.
After having reviewed this aspect of liability concerning a landlord
in relation to his tenants and others, I question the wisdom of the com-
mon law rule, often labeled the "Massachusetts Rule." Strict adherence
to this rule is unrealistic for it fails to take into consideration the in-
crease in apartment living.57 Invariably, where a tenant occupies a
suite in a modem apartment house, he is neither able nor equipped to
remove ice or snow from the common ways. It may be true that a land-
lord of a modern apartment house assumes the obligation of snow and ice
removal, but under the common law rule he is far better off if he re-
frains from snow removal. If he never assumes the obligation and a
tenant is injured, he has no liability. This, of course, puts a greater
55 Supra n. 34.
56 Id. at 282.
57 See, Cleveland Press, February 11, 1966. An article in this edition brought out
a study by the housing specialists for Allied Chemical Corporation's Barrett Di-
vision. This study revealed that a little more than a decade ago approximately 8%
of the nation's families resided in apartment type dwellings. The study further re-




LANDLORD-ICE AND SNOW 311
premium on inaction than it does on an affirmative constructive action
and the inaction is at the expense of those who are unable to abate the
dangerous condition themselves.
The "Connecticut Rule" is not a totally new approach in the concept
of a landlord's liability. The only thing that this "Modern" view does is
to add, to a landlord's duty of maintaining the common ways in a rea-
sonably safe condition, the obligation of rendering the common ways
safe by removal of natural accumulations of ice and snow. This broad-
ened scope of duty does not make the landlord an insurer of his tenants'
safety but merely requires him to act within a reasonable time. This
view is more realistic and deserves support.
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